to report «iusnews»; After months of accompanying America's policies against Iran, European countries are now worried about the expansion of conflicts and the rise in oil and fuel prices; a concern that shows the consequences of a military adventure do not remain confined to the battlefield and can affect the daily lives of citizens and the economic stability of countries that played a role in shaping the crisis. Now, the increase in energy costs and the possibility of expanding instability in global markets have led European governments to conclude that continuing the confrontation with Iran can have consequences beyond their initial calculations.
The Guardian newspaper, in a report by Patrick Wintour, wrote that the foreign ministers of eight European and Middle Eastern countries at a meeting in Istanbul have called on America and the Zionist regime not to resume their attacks on Iran. They have warned that the resumption of conflicts could expand the crisis across the region and push oil prices even higher. According to this newspaper, the formation of a kind of multinational "anti-war bloc" has gained importance under conditions in which Tehran's nuclear negotiations are at a deadlock and signs of Washington's and Tel Aviv's willingness to resume military actions are visible.
But the fundamental question is: to what extent did European countries, when accompanying America's and the Zionist regime's actions against Iran, take into account the consequences of such a policy for their own security and economy? Some European governments, by providing facilities and military or logistical support to America, participated in a process that increased pressure on Iran. Now those same countries are warning about the expansion of the crisis and its economic consequences; as if the increase in energy costs has made them more aware than before of the real dimensions of this confrontation.
Europe now faces the contradictory result of a policy in which accompanying military pressure against Iran has been combined with concern about the consequences of that same pressure for the European economy. European governments cannot, on the one hand, play a role in providing the ground for military actions or supporting Washington's policies, and on the other hand, expect the potential consequences of these actions to remain directed only at Iran and the countries of the region. In today's interconnected world, security crises are quickly transferred to energy markets, supply chains, and the living costs of citizens.
In this context, the Strait of Hormuz is one of the most important determining variables in security and economic equations. This strategic waterway is considered the passage route for an important part of the global trade in oil and gas, and any serious disruption in the transit of energy-carrying ships through it can confront global markets with a shock. The rise in oil prices, the growth of transportation costs, and the increase in the price of petroleum products are among the consequences that can quickly be transferred to the economies of energy-importing countries.
Iran, too, due to its geographical position and strategic capacities in the region, is an important part of the global energy security equations. For this reason, the possibility of disruption in the transit of energy through the Strait of Hormuz, even without the realization of the scenario of this waterway being closed, can affect market expectations and governments' calculations. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz is not a certain and inevitable consequence, but ignoring the risks arising from the intensification of the confrontation around it would also not be realistic. Governments that support increased military pressure on Iran must also take into account in their calculations the possibility of reciprocal reactions and their effects on the global energy market.
For European countries, this issue is doubly important. The rise in oil and fuel prices does not only raise the cost of energy supply; it can also increase production costs in factories, the transportation of goods, services, and the provision of households' daily needs. Under such circumstances, inflationary pressure intensifies, and European industries may face greater difficulty in competing with producers in other regions of the world. In this way, the consequences of the crisis go beyond the level of foreign relations and become a direct issue in the lives of citizens and the performance of European economies.
For this reason, today's concern of European countries cannot be considered merely a diplomatic position; this concern reflects the collision of political calculations with economic and geopolitical realities. Accompanying Washington may have political or security considerations for some European governments, but this accompaniment does not mean immunity from the consequences of America's decisions. When the crisis expands, Washington's allies may also face costs in which they had no determining role in the initial decision-making and whose effects they cannot easily prevent.
The position taken by the foreign ministers of eight countries in Istanbul shows that concern about the expansion of the crisis has now become one of the serious considerations in relations among the countries of the region and Europe. However, opposition to the resumption of military actions does not necessarily mean a fundamental change in the policy of these countries toward Iran; perhaps concern about economic and security costs has driven them to adopt such a position more than any other factor. Nevertheless, this same concern also shows that the continuation of the confrontation can create divisions even among America's allies and increase the political costs of Washington's decisions.
Ultimately, the increase in Europe's concern about oil and fuel prices is a reminder of a clear reality: one cannot play a role in intensifying a crisis and expect its costs to remain solely on the shoulders of the opposing side. European governments must learn from the current experience that their energy security and economic stability are not separate from developments in the Middle East, and that military policies can create unforeseen consequences for their own supporters. Now that the increase in energy costs has become a serious concern, the fundamental question remains: why were the economic and security consequences of this path not given the place they have today in the calculations of European countries before accompanying military actions against Iran?
