to report «iusnews»; The Forty-Day War was not merely a military confrontation between Iran and the coalition composed of the United States and the Israeli regime; it also became a stage on which the region’s hidden realities were exposed. Many regional actors that had sought in recent years to present themselves as influential powers in West Asia were confronted in this major test with hard geopolitical realities. Among them, the United Arab Emirates holds a special position, a country that over the past two decades has sought, by relying on its economic wealth and strategic ties with Washington and Tel Aviv, to play a role in regional equations beyond its natural weight.
In recent years, Abu Dhabi’s rulers have assumed that they could compensate for their geopolitical and demographic limitations through external support. As a result, the UAE’s foreign policy gradually moved away from an approach based on regional cooperation and shifted toward participation in the security and political projects of extra-regional powers. From Libya and Sudan to Yemen and the Horn of Africa, traces of this policy can be observed. However, the Forty-Day War demonstrated that reliance on external actors does not necessarily create lasting security and influence.
One of the most important lessons of this war was that major powers support their allies when it serves their interests, and in critical moments, their priority is preserving their own interests rather than ensuring the security of regional partners. The experience of recent decades in West Asia has repeatedly confirmed this reality. At various points, the United States has shown that it is willing to sacrifice even its closest allies in response to strategic shifts and changing circumstances.
Nevertheless, it appears that part of the UAE’s political elite still believes that proximity to Washington and Tel Aviv can provide a form of strategic immunity. Security agreements, intelligence cooperation, and the normalization of relations with the Israeli regime can all be analyzed within this framework. Yet the Forty-Day War demonstrated that this calculation is not aligned with regional realities.
Throughout the war, one of the principal objectives of the United States and the Israeli regime was to alter the regional balance of power. They believed that by applying extensive military pressure, they could weaken Iran’s position and impose their preferred order on the region. Some regional actors also assumed that by aligning themselves with this project, they would gain a larger share of power and influence. However, the final outcome was quite different.
The failure of the war’s declared and undeclared objectives demonstrated that the region’s power structure is far more complex than can be reshaped through military operations or foreign alliances. This reality is especially significant for the UAE because a substantial part of its foreign policy in recent years has been based on the assumption that regional balances can be altered with the support of extra-regional actors.
Geography, however, has its own logic. The UAE is located in a region where its security depends above all on the stability of its surroundings. The country possesses neither extensive strategic depth, nor a large population, nor military capabilities comparable to those of the region’s principal powers. Much of the UAE’s strength is rooted in its economy, trade, investment, and transit role. Therefore, any widespread instability in the region can affect Abu Dhabi’s interests more severely than those of many other countries.
For this reason, tying the country’s future to tension-generating projects and foreign military alliances is not compatible with the UAE’s national interests in the long run. The experience of the Forty-Day War showed that any large-scale regional conflict can quickly affect economic security, energy, trade, and investment, the very sectors that constitute the pillars of the UAE’s power.
Another important point is that the Forty-Day War once again demonstrated that real power in West Asia does not stem solely from advanced military equipment or foreign backing. National will, indigenous capabilities, internal cohesion, and the ability to withstand external pressure remain among the most important components of power. Many calculations based on technological superiority or support from major powers were challenged during this war.
For the UAE, this reality should be regarded as a serious warning. A country whose security and stability are largely dependent on its surrounding environment cannot pursue confrontational policies indefinitely. The greater the gap between Abu Dhabi’s policies and the geopolitical realities of the region, the higher the costs of that gap will become. In recent years, signs of reassessment in certain aspects of the UAE’s foreign policy have become visible. Efforts to reduce tensions with some regional countries and expand economic relations with neighbors can be evaluated within this framework. Nevertheless, the Forty-Day War showed that this process requires greater depth and seriousness.
Sustainable security in the Persian Gulf is achieved not through foreign alliances but through cooperation among the countries of the region. Historical experience has also shown that the presence of extra-regional powers has generally complicated crises rather than reduced tensions. Whenever regional countries have been able to manage their differences through dialogue and cooperation, stability has increased and greater economic opportunities have emerged.
From a strategic perspective, the most important lesson of the Forty-Day War for the UAE is that security cannot be purchased. No arms contract, security agreement, or foreign support can replace stable and constructive relations with neighboring countries. States that build their security on artificial balances will face serious vulnerabilities when international conditions change.
Today, Abu Dhabi stands before an important choice. The first path is to continue policies that place it alongside extra-regional projects and inadvertently make it part of costly rivalries. The second path is to move toward regional cooperation, respect geopolitical realities, and invest in sustainable relations with neighboring countries.
The Forty-Day War demonstrated that the future of West Asia will be determined by the peoples of the region, not by external actors. Any country that recognizes this reality sooner will incur fewer costs and gain greater opportunities for development and stability. For the UAE, perhaps this is the most important message of the war: that a sustainable position in the region is achieved through cooperation and coexistence, not through attachment to projects whose fate is determined in distant capitals.
If Abu Dhabi’s rulers take this message seriously, the Forty-Day War could become the starting point for a strategic reassessment of the country’s foreign policy, a reassessment that would benefit not only the UAE but also the stability and security of the entire region.
